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Abstract: This article attempts to demonstrate that the ninth-century patriarch 
Methodius of Constantinople undertook a radical deconstruction of the conceptual 
framework of traditional Trinitarian theology, which resulted in the subversion of 
all recognisable differences between the second and the third person of the Trinity. 
It consists of three parts: a detailed analysis of a Trinitarian excursus in Methodius’ 
Life of the Iconophile confessor Euthymius of Sardes, which pays close attention to 
terminological and syntactical ambiguities; a comparison of this excursus with 
similar discussions by other authors of the time; and the identification of 
developments in the Late Antique theological discourse that can explain 
Methodius’ particular understanding of the Trinity. 
 
Following decades of bitter controversy the Second Ecumenical Council declared 
in 381 that the Christian God was three persons sharing one common divinity. This 
formula proved to be a lasting success and eventually came to be recognised by 
all Christian communities. By contrast, the conceptual framework that explained 
and justified it fared much less well: based on a highly complex and idiosyncratic 
combination of disparate philosophical notions, it caused great difficulties to later 
theologians who struggled to make sense of it.1 
In the sixth century this obscurity resulted in a new controversy when theologians 
such as John Philoponus proposed a ‘Tritheistic’ interpretation of the Trinity and 
the defenders of the traditional view either fell into the ‘Sabellian’ trap or tried to 
                                                 
1 Contemporary scholarship has proposed several conflicting interpretations. Cf. the most recent 
interpretation by J. Zachhuber, Human Nature in Gregory of Nyssa. Philosophical Background 
and Theological Significance (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 46; Leiden, Boston, Cologne, 
2000), pp. 17-122. 
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solve the problem by mere fiat.2 Tritheism was finally overcome both in the Mono-
physite and in the Chalcedonian churches (although with questionable success), 
but this does not mean that Trinitarian speculation came to an end. In a previous 
publication I have argued that it was alive and well in the seventh century when 
Leontius of Jerusalem proposed a radical reinterpretation of the inner-Trinitarian 
relations through substitution of the conventional essentialist and static framework 
with a new voluntaristic and developmental one.3 In this article I will attempt to 
show that the discussion continued into the eighth and ninth centuries. These 
centuries are even less well studied than the immediately preceding period and 
there has been a tendency to focus on creedal statements and to assume that these 
statements express the views of the authors who quoted them.4 It goes without 
saying that this approach is methodologically unsound. Creedal formulae are 
shibboleths of orthodoxy and can therefore not be taken as evidence that their 
content was truly accepted or even understood. For a proper evaluation of an 
author’s views on the Trinity we must instead look at passages where he presents 
his views in the form of an argument and we must analyse his statements as care-
fully as those of authors of the fourth and fifth centuries instead of being satisfied 
with superficial readings. 
In what follows I will focus on Methodius of Syracuse, a monk and patriarchal 
deacon in Constantinople who rose to prominence as one of the leaders of the re-
sistance against official Iconoclasm in the early ninth century and who as patriarch 
was later responsible for the restoration of the cult of images in the Orthodox 
Church.5 Methodius was not only a church politician but also a prolific author of 
saints’ lives and religious poems. I have written elsewhere about his anthropological 
speculations, arguing that they are highly original reinterpretations of Patristic 
concepts with the aim of making these concepts relevant in the radically changed 
world of the Early Middle Ages.6 Now I hope to show that his views on the Trinity 
are no less original and that he embarks on a radical deconstruction of the conceptual 
framework of traditional Trinitarian theology, which results in the subversion of 
all recognisable differences between the second and the third person of the Trinity. 
In order to make my case I will analyse a passage in a Trinitarian excursus in 
Methodius’ Life of the Iconophile confessor Euthymius of Sardes, establish the 
function of this passage within its context, compare Methodius’ treatment of the 
                                                 
2 For a brief overview of the controversy cf. R. Y. Ebied, A. van Roey, L. R. Wickham, Peter 
of Callinicum. Anti-Tritheist Dossier (OLA 10; Leuven, 1981), pp. 20-33. 
3 D. Krausmüller, ‘Divine self-invention: Leontius of Jerusalem’s reinterpretation of the Patristic 
model of the Christian God’, The Journal of Theological Studies. New Series 57 (2006), pp. 526-45. 
4 Cf. e.g. H.-G. Beck, Kirche und theologische Literatur im byzantinischen Reich (Handbuch 
der Altertumswissenschaft, 12.2.1 ; Munich, 1959), p. 308, on John of Damascus. 
5 For Methodius’ biography and writings, cf. R.-J. Lilie, C. Ludwig, Th. Pratsch, I. Rochow, F. 
Winkelmann, Prosopographie der mittelbyzantinischen Zeit, I.3: Leon – Placentius (Berlin and 
New York, 2000), pp. 233-239, no. 4977, with literature. 
6 Cf. D. Krausmüller, ‘Divine sex: Patriarch Methodios’s concept of virginity’, in L. James 
(ed.), Desire and Denial in Byzantium (Aldershot, 1999), pp. 57-65; D. Krausmüller, ‘Exegeting 
the Passio of St Agatha: Patriarch Methodius († 847) on sexual differentiation and the perfect 
“man”’, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies 33 (2009) 1-16. 
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topic with similar discussions by other authors of the time, and identify develop-
ments in the Late Antique theological discourse that can explain his particular 
understanding of the Trinity. 
I have chosen to start with the in-depth analysis of just a few lines of text because 
Methodius is an extremely demanding author. His intentions reveal themselves 
only to the attentive reader who is prepared to fill the gaps in his often incomplete 
statements.7 This task is not made any easier by the way in which Methodius pre-
sents his argument. It could be said that he was the Heidegger of his time: he coins 
new words or uses existing words in unexpected ways and he deliberately creates 
ambiguity at the syntactical and lexicographical levels.8 In what follows I have 
attempted to make my case without involving these features so as not to encumber 
the discussion with long digressions, but it has not always been possible to exclude 
them altogether. 
 
 
I. 
 
The passage in the Life of Euthymius of Sardes that I have chosen as my starting 
point is part of an excursus about the divine image in man, which is presented in 
the form of an exegesis of Genesis 1:26.9 Methodius starts from the traditional view 
that the divine image in man is to be identified with his logikovn but then adds that 
the formula kat’ eijkovna in Genesis 1:26 must not be understood as referring solely 
to the Word as the second person of the Trinity.10 This rejection of a well-established 
interpretation of the verse is based on the following considerations. Firstly there is 
the grammatical argument that the pronoun hJmetevran and the verb poihvswmen do 
not refer to two persons but at least to three,11 and secondly Methodius reasons that 
if man were merely logikov~ he would only be the image of the second person of 
the Trinity, which cannot exist on its own, and supports this contention with the 
observation that in man, too, the lovgo~ cannot function without the ‘mind’ (nou'~) 
from which it issues forth and the ‘drawing of breath’ (ajeriva oJlkhv), which ac-
companies it.12 With this comparison Methodius introduces the concept of the 
Imago Trinitatis, which sees Father, Son and Spirit and their relations with each 
other reflected in the human mind, word and breath.13 
                                                 
7 Cf. D. Krausmüller, ‘Being, seeming and becoming: Patriarch Methodius on divine impersonation 
of angels and souls and the Origenist alternative’, forthcoming in Byzantion. 
8 D. Krausmüller, ‘Strategies of equivocation and the construction of multiple meanings in Middle 
Byzantine texts’, Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik 56 (2006), pp. 1-11. 
9 Methodius, Life of Euthymius, 32-35, ed. and trans. J. Gouillard, ‘La vie d’Euthyme de Sardes 
(+ 831), un œuvre du patriarche Méthode’, Travaux et Mémoires 10 (1987), pp. 1-101, esp. pp. 67-
73.651-752. 
10 Cf. e.g. Anastasius of Sinai, Sermo II.1, ed. K.-H. Uthemann, Anastasii Sinaitae sermones 
duo in constitutionem hominis secundum imaginem Dei necnon opuscula adversus monotheletas 
(CC. SG, 12; Turnhout and Leuven, 1985), p. 39, ll. 63-68. 
11 Methodius, Life of Euthymius, 33, ed. Gouillard, p. 69, ll. 681-85. 
12 Methodius, Life of Euthymius, 33, ed. Gouillard, p. 69, ll. 686-91. 
13 Cf. L. Thunberg, Microcosm and mediator: the theological anthropology of Maximus the 
Confessor (Acta Seminarii Neotestamentici Upsaliensis, 25; Lund, 1965), pp. 137-39. 
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This concept, which had already been employed by Gregory of Nazianzus,14 was 
very popular in the late Patristic discourse and is regularly found in authors such 
as Anastasius of Antioch, Maximus the Confessor, Anastasius of Sinai and John 
of Damascus.15 In Methodius’ case its adaptation results in a shift in the meaning 
of the terms logikovn and lovgo~: whereas in Late Antique Christian texts the two 
words had denoted ‘rationality’ and ‘reason’, Methodius understands logikovn in 
its etymological sense as ‘wordliness’,16 and he identifies the human lovgo~ with 
the ‘uttered word’ (proforiko;~ lovgo~).17 This re-interpretation has repercussions 
for the divine archetype: by linking the distinctions between the three divine per-
sons to articulated speech and by discussing them in the context of creation Meth-
odius gives the impression that these distinctions are bound up with the divine 
operations ad extra, which implies a modalist understanding of the Trinity. 
While being of questionable orthodoxy, such a position would still be well within 
the parameters of the Late Antique Christian discourse. However, detailed analysis 
of one sentence within the excursus shows that this is not Methodius’ last word on 
the topic and that he aims at subverting the very framework on which traditional 
Trinitarian theology is based: 
 
ajlla; tiv fhsin hJ grafhv, ma'llon de; oJ qeo;~ kai; pathvr: poihvswmen a[nqrwpon 
kat’ eijkovna hJmetevran kai; kaq’ oJmoivwsin; e[cei ga;r ajlhqw'~ oJ a[nqrwpo~ to; 
kat’ eijkovna dia; tou' logikou' wJ~ ejk tou' qeou' lovgou dhmiourghqei;~ logikw'~, 
o{per logiko;n ajlhqevstata cwri;~ nou' tou' wJ~ patro;~ kai; ajeriva~ oJlkh'~ th'~ wJ~ 
pneuvmato~ kaqa; e[famen ou[te kinei'tai ou[t’ ejnergei' pwvpote ejpeidh; kai; oJ 
dhmiourgo;" qeo;" lovgo" ejk nou' tou' patro;" probevblhtai kai; eij" zwopoivhsin 
tw'n aJpavntwn ejgnwvristai wJ" sundhmiourgo;n patri; kai; uiJw'/ o{per ei|" qeo;" su;n 
tw'/ patri; kai; tw'/ uiJw'/ wJmolovghtai.18 
 
                                                 
14 Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio XXIII.11, ed. and trans. J. Mossay, Grégoire de Nazianze, 
Discours 20-23 (SC, 270; Paris, 1980), p. 302, ll. 4-8: mivan kai; th;n aujth;n ... fuvsin qeovthto" 
ajnavrcw/ kai; gennhvsei kai; proovdw/ gnwrizomevnhn wJ" nw'/ tw'/ ejn hJmi'n kai; lovgw/ kai; pneuvmati. 
15 Cf. e.g. Anastasius of Antioch, Expositio dogmatica I.31, ed. S. N. Sakkos, Anastasii I 
Antiocheni opera omnia genuina quae supersunt (Salonica, 1976), p. 26, ll. 22-24: lovgo~ ga;r 
cwri;~ pneuvmato~ oujk e[stin, wJ~ oujde; nou'~ cwri;~ lovgou: nou'n dev famen to;n patevra tou' 
lovgou, nou'n ejn w|/ oJ lovgo~ meq’ ou| to; pneu'ma; Maximus, Ambigua 7, PG 91, 1088A: wJ" noi>; tw'/ 
megavlw/ kai; lovgw/ kai; pneuvmati to;n hJmevteron nou'n te kai; lovgon kai; pneu'ma ... 
proscwrhvsante"; John of Damascus, De duabus in Christo voluntatibus, 30, ed. B. Kotter, 
Johannes von Damaskos, Schriften, IV: Opera polemica, Liber de haeresibus (PTS, 22; Berlin, 
1981), pp. 215-16: kata; povsou" trovpou" levgetai tov kat’ eijkovna ... kata; to; genna'n to;n nou'n 
lovgon kai; probavllein pneu'ma. Cf. also the eighth-century Pseudo-Athanasian Sermon on the 
Annunciation, 4, PG 28, 921C: kai; w{sper pavlin eij" to;n kat’ eijkovna kai; oJmoivwsin qeou' 
genovmenon a[nqrwpon ajpoblevponte" a{ma tou'ton nou'n kai; lovgon kai; pneu'ma kaqorw'men. 
16 Gouillard translates logikovn as ‘la faculté de verbe’, but states in footnote 135 on page 70: 
‘On aimerait traduire par “verbéité”.’ 
17 Twice in the excursus Methodius uses the formula proforiko;" kai; sofo;" lovgo", cf. Life 
of Euthymius, 33, ed. Gouillard, pp. 69-71, ll. 707-8, The notion of ‘wisdom’ is usually closely re-
lated to rationality but since it is combined with ‘articulate’ it is more likely to refer to Proverbs 
10:13: o}" ejk ceilevwn profevrei sofivan rJavbdw/ tuvptei a[ndra ajkavrdion. 
18 Methodius, Life of Euthymius, 33, ed. Gouillard, p. 69, ll. 692-98. 
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But why does Scripture or rather the God and Father say: ‘Let us make man 
according to our image and according to our likeness’? For man has indeed the (sc. 
status of being) according to the image through his ‘wordliness’ as having been 
created by the God Word in a ‘wordly’ manner, which ‘wordliness’, as we have 
said, neither moves nor operates at any time without the mind as father and the 
drawing of breath as spirit, since the creator God Word, too, is projected from the 
mind, that is, the Father, and recognised is for the vivification of all things as being 
co-creator with the Father and the Son that which is confessed as one God with the 
Father and the Son.19  
 
This sentence consists of two parts, a main clause and a subordinate clause in-
troduced by the conjunction ejpeidhv. The main clause merely sums up the results 
of the previous discussion. By contrast, the subordinate clause introduces an aspect 
that Methodius had not yet set out in detail, namely the inner-Trinitarian relations 
that provide the starting point for the divine image in man. At this point one would 
expect a straightforward exposé of Trinitarian theology. However, this is not what 
Methodius presents us with. When one reads the sentence for the first time one 
immediately recognises several oddities. The subordinate clause starts as a state-
ment about the Word and then switches to the Spirit but in such a way that this 
shift is not immediately obvious. The second verb, ejgnwvristai, follows the first, 
probevblhtai, with which it is correlated, without any reference to a new subject 
and a reader will assume that it still refers back to lovgo~, in particular since both 
verbs are used in the third person singular of the perfect passive. That we are dealing 
with a new subject only becomes clear when we read beyond ejgnwvristai and 
even then this subject is not named but can only be inferred by a process of ex-
clusion: once we come across the Dative uiJw'/ we know that we are dealing with a 
third entity beside the Father and the Son, which our knowledge of the Christian 
creed then causes us to identify with the Holy Spirit. There can be no doubt that 
this ambiguity is created deliberately: nothing would have been easier than to in-
sert a subject to; a{gion pneu'ma either immediately before or immediately after 
eij~ zwopoivhsin tw'n aJpavntwn ejgnwvristai. 
Indeed, further analysis reveals that Methodius creates ambiguity not only through 
misleading syntax but also through the use of equivocal individual expressions. The 
most obvious oddity is the verb probevblhtai, which defines the relationship be-
tween the Father and the Word through comparison with the relationship between 
‘mind’ (nou`~) and ‘uttered word’ (lovgo~ proforikov~) in a human being. The verb 
probavllein fits well into this context since it can have the meaning ‘to utter’ and 
is thus synonymous with profevrein,20 This is evident not only from numerous 
                                                 
19 Cf. Gouillard’s translation: ‘Puisque Dieu le Verbe créateur lui-meme a été émis par l’intellect 
Père et puisqu’a été révélé pour la vivification de l’univers, en tant que co-créateur avec le Père et 
le Fils, Celui qui a été confessé comme un seul et même Dieu avec le Père et le Fils.’ 
20 According to the Lexicon of Liddell & Scott this use is first attested in the imperal period, 
cf. e.g. Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca historica, III.8.3, ed. F. Vogel (Leipzig, 1888), vol. I, p. 276, 
l. 9: fwnh;n ojxei'an probavllonte". 
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Late Antique and Byzantine theological texts,21 but also from Methodius’ Encomium 
of Agatha where he defines ‘words’ (lovgoi) as ‘projections of thoughts’ (nohmavtwn 
problhvmata).22 When we look at the context of the sentence under discussion we 
find that ‘projection’ is not the only way in which this relationship is conceptualised 
because Methodius also speaks of the mind as the ‘begetter’ (gennhvtwr) of the 
word.23 Such mixing of metaphors was common enough at the time: Photius, for 
example, once castigates the Monophysites as ‘begetters of outlandish … projections’ 
(ejkfuvlwn ... problhmavtwn gennhvtore").24 As long as we limit the discussion to 
the human sphere Methodius’ statement thus seems to be entirely appropriate. 
However, it must be remembered that probevblhtai appears in a specifically 
Trinitarian context where it denotes the relation between the Father and the Son. 
Early Christian authors such as Justin or Eusebius used genna'n and probavllein 
interchangeably in their discussions of the relationship between Father and Son, 
evidently prompted by the Johannine appellation ‘Word’ for the Son.25 This un-
selfconscious use of the two terms, however, came to an end in the later fourth 
century when the status of the Spirit became an issue. From then on the verb 
probavllein denotes exclusively the procession of the Spirit from the Father 
whereas the relationship between Father and Son is unequivocally expressed 
through genna'n. Gregory of Nazianzus, for example, states that there is ‘the 
Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit: the one being generator and projector … 
and the others either product of generation or product of projection’ (oJ path;r kai; 
oJ uiJo;" kai; to; a{gion pneu'ma: oJ me;n gennhvtwr kai; proboleuv" ... tw'n de; to; me;n 
gevnnhma to; de; provblhma).26 Later Patristic authors simply repeat this formula, 
which by then had become fossilised,27 both in creedal statements and also in the 
particular context of the Imago Trinitatis.28 This remarkable terminological con-
sistency is, of course, not accidental: it is demanded by orthodox Trinitarian theo-
logy. The Cappadocians had conceptualised the Trinity as one substance in three 
                                                 
21 Cf. e.g. Theodore of Stoudios, Antirrhetici, I, PG 99, 329A: problhqhvsetai oJ lovgo". 
22 Methodius, Encomium of Agatha, 16, ed. E. Mioni, ‘L’encomio di S. Agata di Metodio 
patriarcha di Costantinopoli’, ABoll 68 (1950) p. 58-93, esp. p. 84, l. 29. 
23 Methodius, Life of Euthymius, 33, ed. Gouillard, p. 71, ll. 717-19: to; kata; th;n qeivan eijkovna 
doqe;n hJmi'n kai; dhmiourghqe;n logiko;n tou' oijkeivou noo;~ wJ~ gennhvtoro~ uJpofaivnei ta; ejktu-
pwvmata. 
24 Photius, Letters, 285, ed. B. Laourdas and L. G. Westerink, Photii Patriarchae Constantino-
politani Epistulae et Amphilochia, vol. 3: Epistularum pars tertia (Leipzig, 1985), p. 102, ll. 122-23. 
25 Cf. e.g. Justin, Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo, 62, PG 6, 617C: tou'to to; tw'/ o[nti ajpo; tou' 
patro;" problhqe;n gevnnhma; and Eusebius, Ecclesiastical Theology, I.8, ed. E. Klostermann and 
G. C. Hansen, Eusebius, Werke, IV: Gegen Marcell, Uber die kirchliche Theologie, Die Frag-
mente Marcells (2nd ed., Berlin, 1972), p. 66, ll. 25-27: probalevsqai gevnnhma. 
26 Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio, XXIX.9, ed. P. Gallay, Grégoire de Nazianze, Discours 27-
31 (Discours théologiques) (SC, 250; Paris, 1978), p. 180, ll. 14-17. 
27 Of course, probavllesqai is not always used in such contexts. Many theologians preferred 
the Biblical term ejkporeuvesqai, without doubt because probolhv had been used by the Gnostics 
as a technical term for ‘emanation’, cf. Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses I.2.6, PG 67, 465A. 
28 Cf. e.g. John of Damascus, De duabus in Christo voluntatibus, 30, ed. Kotter, Schriften, IV, 
pp. 215-16: to; genna'n to;n nou'n lovgon kai; probavllein pneu'ma. 
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hypostases and had defined hypostasis as ‘substance with idioms’ (oujsiva meta; 
ijdiwmavtwn).29 Accordingly, it was essential to distinguish the idioms clearly from 
each other and to avoid terminological ambiguities. Patristic theologians therefore 
took pains to emphasise the difference between the second and the third person of 
the Trinity even when Scripture appears to use the same terms to express their re-
lation with the first person. The sixth-century author Anastasius of Antioch, for 
example, states in his first Dogmatic Exposition:  
 
mh; qaumavzwmen de; levgonto~ tou' kurivou e[xodon ajpo; tou' patro;~ th;n eJkatevrou 
provodon: ejgw; gavr, fhsin, ejk tou' patro;~ ejxh'lqon kai; h{kw, kai; pavlin: to; pneu'ma 
o} para; tou' patro;~ ejkporeuvetai: kai; ga;r kai; to; ejxelqei'n kai; to; ejkporeuqh'nai 
taujto;n ejntau'qa shmaivnei, tw'/ pneuvmati gou'n th;n ejkpovreusin ma'llon kat’ ejx-
aivreton h{rmosen w{sper eJautw'/ th;n gevnnhsin.30 
 
Let us not wonder that the Lord called ‘exit’ the coming forth of either person from 
the Father, for he says: ‘I have come out of the father and am come’, and again: ‘the 
Spirit, which comes from the Father’. Here ‘coming out’ and ‘having come out’ mean 
the same thing. Yet he rather attributed ‘coming out’ specifically to the Spirit, just 
as ‘birth’ to himself. 
 
It is evident that Methodius takes exactly the opposite approach when he gives 
the Son a characteristic that had for hundreds of years been reserved for the Spirit 
but it is not yet clear why he should have done so. One possible explanation would 
be to assume a lapsus calami in particular since Methodius was, of course, aware 
of the ‘correct’ version: in the Life of Euthymius he speaks of the ‘inconfoundibility 
of the persons’ (to; ajsuvgcuton tw'n proswvpwn),31 and in his Passio of Denys he 
lets the saint profess his faith in ‘a Father … the ingenerate, a Son, alone generate 
… and a Spirit that proceeds from the Father’ (patevra ... to;n ajgevnhton uiJo;n 
gennhto;n movnon ... kai; pneu'ma to; proi>o;n ejk patevro").32 However, such an 
explanation cannot account for the deliberately ambiguous syntax and it is also 
gainsaid by further equivocation at the level of individual expressions.33 
                                                 
29 For later references cf. Thalassius the Libyan, Centuriae, IV.88, PG 91, 1468B: uJpovstasin 
de; oJrivzousin oujsivan meta; ijdiwmavtwn, identified as patrovth", uiJovth" and ejkpovreusi"; Theodore 
of Stoudios, Antirretici, I.1, PG 99, 329B. 
30 Anastasius of Antioch, Expositio dogmatica, I.1.27, ed. Sakkos, p. 25, ll. 3-8. 
31 Methodius, Life of Euthymius of Sardes, 33, ed. Gouillard, p. 69, ll. 674-75. 
32 Methodius, Encomium of Denys, 10, ed. J. C. Westerbrink, Passio S. Dionysii Areopagitae 
Rustici et Eleutherii uitgegeven naar het Leidse Handschrift Vulcanianus 52 (Alphen, 1937), p. 
54, ll. 21-25. 
33 Further study may well reveal that Methodius’ views are not as idiosyncratic as they might 
first seem. The eleventh-century theologian and spiritual author Nicetas Stethatos deals in his 
writings extensively with the Imago Trinitatis and expresses ideas that are strikingly similar to 
what we have found in Methodius. Nicetas’ treatise De anima, for example, contains in chapter 24 
a passage where the soul is characterised as ‘having a mind as its purest part, father and projector 
of the word’ (nou'n e[cousa mevro~ aujth'~ to; kaqarwvtaton patevra kai; proboleva tou' lovgou), 
ed. J. Darrouzès, Nicétas Stéthatos, Opuscules et lettres (Sources Chrétiennes, 81, Paris, 1961), p. 
86, ll. 6-7. This statement contains two oddities: firstly, there is no reference to the Spirit, and 
secondly the term proboleuv~, which traditionally defined the relationship between the first and 
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That such equivocation is not limited to probevblhtai becomes obvious when 
we turn to the part of the sentence that seems to refer to the Holy Spirit. After pro-
bevblhtai one might expect a similar verb to express the way in which the Spirit 
is related to the Father, as is indeed often found in Patristic texts in statements such 
as ‘from the Father the Son has been born and the Spirit goes out’ (ejk tou' patro;~ 
oJ uiJo;~ gegevnnhtai kai; to; pneu'ma ejkporeuvetai).34 Had Methodius opted for 
such a straightforward statement the implications of an attribution of probolhv to 
the Word would immediately have become evident to his readers. Instead, he 
chooses to employ the verb gnwrivzein, which while being correlated with pro-
bevblhtai and also appearing in the perfect passive, does not denote an inner-
Trinitarian relation. However, this does not mean that there is no connection be-
tween the two words; for ejgnwvristai conjures up the concept of ‘characteristic 
property’ (gnwristikh; ijdiovth~), which permits the recognition of the divine persons 
as distinct entities.35 Since the second part of the sentence seems to identify the 
subject of ejgnwvristai as the Spirit, contemporary readers would surely have 
been reminded that one of the terms to denote this ‘mark’ (gnwvrisma) in the case 
of the Spirit is ‘projection’ (probolhv, probavllesqai), which as we have seen 
has just been applied to the Word. Therefore one can argue that Methodius chose 
this verb in order to indicate in a rather more oblique way that he deviated from 
the earlier Patristic consensus with its insistence that the characteristic idioms of 
each person are not communicable or interchangeable.36 
Moreover, it must be recognised that the prepositional phrase eij~ zwopoivhsin 
tw'n aJpavntwn is ambiguous. While in many texts the Holy Spirit is called ‘life-
                                                                                                                                     
the third persons of the Trinity, is used alongside pathvr to characterise the relationship between 
the first and second persons of the Trinity. 
34 Pseudo-Athanasius, Dialogi duo contra Macedonianos, PG 28, 1304C. 
35 Cf. e.g. Emperor Justinian, Contra Monophysitas, 180, ed. E. Schwartz, Drei dogmatische 
Schriften Iustinians (Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-
historische Abteilung, NF, 18; Munich, 1939), p. 39, l. 6: ta;~ gnwristika;~ ijdiovthta~. 
36 This interpretation can be substantiated when we also take into consideration the prepositional 
phrase eij" zwopoivhsin tw'n aJpavntwn. The syntax requires that it refer to the verb ejgnwvristai, 
which it precedes. However, the construction is decidedly odd as can be seen from the translation 
‘is recognised for the purpose of vivifying all things’ (this problem is glossed over by Gouillard 
who translates: ‘a été révélé pour la vivification de l’univers’). Indeed, when Greek authors use 
this verb they invariably construe it with a dative or with a prepositional phrase. Here I will only 
give two examples: Gregory of Nazianzus states in his twenty-third Oratio that we conceptualise 
God as ‘one and the same … nature, which is recognised through eternity and birth and procession’ 
(mivan kai; th;n aujthvn ... fuvsin qeovthto" ajnavrcw/ kai; gennhvsei kai; proovdw/ gnwrizomevnhn), cf. 
above note 12; and the author of the Pseudo-Cyrillian treatise De sancta trinitate avers that ‘the 
father is characterised by and recognised from his having a Son’ (oJ path;r ejk tou' e[cein uiJo;n 
carakthrivzetai kai; gnwrivzetai), cf. Pseudo-Cyril, De sancta trinitate, PG 77, 1149C. In order 
to make sense of Methodius’ sentence we therefore need to supply such an element to which the 
prepositional phrase eij" zwopoivhsin tw'n aJpavntwn would then refer. This could have been ‘to 
be’, but it could equally have been ‘to project’, which is after all the characteristic property of the 
Spirit. Accordingly one could add ejk tou' probeblh'sqai or tw'/ probeblh'sqai to eij" zwopoivhsin 
tw'n aJpavntwn ejgnwvristai and thus arrive at the reading ‘has been recognised by its having been 
projected for the purpose of vivifying all things’, which drives home the point that the verb pro-
bavllein, which has just been applied to the Son, is usually reserved for the Spirit. 
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giving’ (zwopoiovn), vivification was not considered to be a characteristic of the 
third person of the Trinity alone. The Old Testament contains passages such as II 
Esdras 19:5: ‘You are yourself the only Lord: you have made the heaven and … 
the earth … and you vivify everything’ (su; ei\ aujto;~ kuvrio~ movno~: su; ejpoivhsa~ 
to;n oujrano;n kai; ... th;n gh'n ... kai; su; zw/opoiei'~ ta; pavnta),37 which Patristic 
authors interpreted as referring to all three divine persons and therefore to the di-
vine nature. Cyril of Alexandria, for example, asserts in his Commentary on the 
Gospel of John that ‘the creator of all things vivifies … all things since he is life 
by nature’ (zwogonei' ... ta; pavnta zwh; kata; fuvsin uJpavrcwn oJ pavntwn dhmiourgov~),38 
and Anastasius of Antioch speaks even more explicitly of God as ‘life and living 
and vivifying substance’ (hJ zwh; kai; zw'sa kai; zwopoio;~ oujsiva).39 For this reason 
the champions of the full divinity of the Spirit in the late fourth century regularly 
refer to this operation in their attempts to ‘prove’ its consubstantiality with the 
Father and the Son. Accordingly the Spirit can be identified not only as sundhmi-
ourgovn but also as suzwopoiovn as it is indeed by Cyril of Alexandria who calls it 
‘co-creating and co-vivifying’ (sugktivzon kai; suzwopoiou'n).40  
This argument can be taken even further. In those instances in the New Testament 
where vivification is mentioned in combination with ‘spirit’ this spirit is identified 
not with the third but with the second person of the Trinity. This is explicitly stated 
in I Corinthians 15:45 where the formula ‘vivifying spirit’ (pneu'ma zwopoiovn) re-
fers to the incarnated Son as the ‘last Adam’ (e[scato~  jAdavm),41 and is certainly 
also the most obvious reading of John 6:63 and II Corinthians 3:6 where the spirit 
is juxtaposed with the flesh or the letter.42 The use of this formula in the context 
thus does not only not introduce a specific operation of the Spirit but also reminds 
the readers that the name ‘spirit’ (pneu'ma) itself is not exclusively used to denote 
the third person of the Trinity since Scripture teaches both that ‘God is spirit’ 
(pneu'ma oJ qeov~) and that ‘the Lord is the spirit’ (oJ kuvrio~ to; pneu'mav ejstin).43 
One could even argue that Methodius’ refusal to insert an explicit reference to the 
third person of the Trinity is meant to highlight the fact that there is not a single 
term that can be exclusively attributed to it. Here, too, his approach is diametrically 
opposed to that of other theologians: Anastasius of Antioch had been forced to 
concede that all three persons can be called both ‘holy’ and ‘spirit’ but had then 
                                                 
37 Cf. also John 5:21: w{sper ga;r oJ path;r ejgeivrei tou;~ nekrou;~ kai; zw/opoiei', ou{tw~ kai; oJ 
uiJo;~ ou}~ qevlei zw/opoiei'. 
38 Cyril of Alexandria, Commentary on the Gospel of John, ed. P. E. Pusey and T. Randall, 
Commentary on the Gospel according to S. John, by Cyril, Archbishop of Alexandria, vol. 2 (A 
library of Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church, 43; Oxford, 1885), p. 445, ll. 10-16. 
39 Cf. e.g. Anastasius of Antioch, Expositio dogmatica, I.1.13, ed. Sakkos, p. 21, ll. 1-2. 
40 Cyril of Alexandria, De sancta trinitate dialogi septem, VII, PG 75, 1116B. 
41 Cf. I Corinthians 15:45: ou{tw kai; gevgraptai: ejgevneto oJ prw'to" a[nqrwpo"  jAda;m eij" 
yuch;n zw'san: oJ e[scato"  jAda;m eij" pneu'ma zwopoiovn. 
42 John 6:63 is a statement about the Son’s descent into this world: here spirit clearly denotes 
the Son’s divinity. In the case of II Corinthians 3:6 the connection with the Son is established in 
verse 17 of the same chapter. 
43 John 4:24; II Corinthians 3:17. 
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insisted that the combination of the two terms is only found in the case of the third 
person of the Trinity.44 
At this point we can conclude that in the first part of the subordinate clause 
Methodius has constructed a statement that ambiguates attributes of divine persons 
and thus erodes the conceptual framework on which traditional Trinitarian theology 
was based. As we have seen he creates a context where all specific markers of the 
third person of the Trinity, its name, its operation and its mode of existence, are 
attributed, either explicitly or through implication, to the second person of the 
Trinity.45 
 
 
II. 
 
The argument that has been presented so far has been based on the unstated 
assumption that Methodius’ attempts at ambiguation are limited to the Spirit and 
do not affect the Word or Son. However, is this really the case? Here we need to 
consider that a statement such as oJ lovgo~ ... probevblhtai can only be interpreted 
as referring to the second person if we accept that a ‘name’ is more unequivocal 
than a characteristic property. However, from the allusion to I Corinthians 15:45 
we can conclude that this is not so in the case of the Spirit, and Methodius offers 
us no reason why we should consider this to be different in the case of the Word 
or Son. Accordingly we can argue that the term Word could also refer to the third 
person of the Trinity, which is ‘projected’ from the Father. 
In order to substantiate this hypothesis I will look more closely at the verb wJmo-
lovghtai, the third perfect passive after probevblhtai and ejgnwvristai. This verb 
will initially be taken to mean ‘is agreed’ or ‘is confessed’ and will conjure up the 
phrase ‘confession of faith’ (oJmologiva th'~ pivstew~),46 in particular since the sub-
ject appears to be ‘one God’ (ei|~ qeov~). However, here one needs to consider that 
it occurs in a context which is saturated with composita containing the element 
oJmo-, such as oJmoduvnamo~, oJmoouvsio~, and oJmofuhv".47 I would argue that by 
creating this cluster Methodius signals to his readers that oJmologei'n is morpho-
logically similar to such words and that he thus alerts them to the existence of the 
adjective oJmolovgo~. Such an interpretation may seem far-fetched but here we 
need to take into account a dimension of Methodius’ texts that I have already 
mentioned at the beginning of this article, namely that words are not used in their 
                                                 
44 Anastasius, Expositio dogmatica, I.1.60-61, ed. Sakkos, p. 35, ll. 19-29. 
45 Such a reading is further insinuated to the reader by the fact that it would make much better 
sense to take ejk nou' tou' patro;" probevblhtai ... eij" zwopoivhsin tw'n aJpavntwn together as one 
statement. Of course, such a reading is ruled out by the presence of the copula kaiv but readers cannot 
help but notice that it would be much more ‘natural’ than the one required by the syntax. This is not 
the only case of such an oddity in the text, cf. Gouillard, ‘Vie d’Euthyme’, p. 69, note 134. 
46 Cf. e.g. Methodius, Life of Euthymius, 9, ed. Gouillard, p. 35, l. 179. 
47 Cf. Methodius, Life of Euthymius, 33, ed. Gouillard, p. 67, l. 668: oJmoduvnamon, and p. 69, l. 
676: oJmoouvsion … oJmofuev". 
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conventional sense but given meanings that are suggested by the components of 
which they are made up.48  
For the sake of brevity I will mention only one example here, which comes from 
a passage in Methodius’ Encomium of Agatha, where the posthumous activity of 
the saint is described. There Methodius tells his audience that the martyr has 
reddened her face and her dress with the blood of the lamb ‘in order to flood the 
dyes of fresh colour towards others who approach her’ (i{na ... qalasseuvh/ toi'" 
prosercomevnoi" eJtevroi" ta;" th'" eujcroiva" bafav").49 The curious expression 
qalasseuvh/ ... bafav~ is otherwise unattested but there exists a verb qalassobafei`n, 
which means ‘to dye purple’.50 There can be no doubt that Methodius derived 
qalasseuvh/ ... bafav~ from this verb because in the same context he uses the 
synonymous aJlibafiva in its conventional sense, ‘dyeing purple’, and the un-
equivocal term porfuvrwsi~.51 Here we thus have a case where Methodius de-
constructs a term and uses its constituent parts in their literal meaning. This gives 
an idea of the complexity of his texts and goes at least some way to showing that a 
derivation of wJmolovghtai from a form oJmolovgo~ is indeed possible.52 
What would be the purpose of such manipulation in the excursus in the Life of 
Euthymius? Even if wJmolovghtai is formally similar to other compounds with oJmo- 
there is, of course, a crucial difference: the other terms refer to the common divinity, 
which confers on each of the three divine persons not only the same oujsiva and 
                                                 
48 This finds its explanation in the great importance of lexicography and etymology for the theo-
logical discourse of the seventh to ninth centuries. The author of an anonymous sermon on the An-
nunciation, for example, employs arguments based on etymology and frequently borrows technical 
terms from the etymological discourse, cf. e.g. Pseudo-Athanasius, Sermon on the Annuncation, 3, 
PG 28, 921A: ijsiva levgetai kat’ ejtumologivan troph'/ tou' i eij~ o, kai; pleonasmw'/ tou' u stoiceivou oujsiva 
diermhneuvetai. It is suggestive that one etymological lexicon of the ninth century is attributed to an 
author named Methodius, cf. R. Reitzenstein, ‘Zu den Quellen des sogenannten Etymologicum 
magnum. 2) Das etymologische Werk des Methodios’, Philologos 49 (1890), pp. 400-420. 
49 Methodius, Encomium of Agatha, 3, ed. Mioni, p. 78, ll. 10-11. 
50 Cf. e.g. Philo of Byzantium, 2, ed. K. Brodersen, Reiseführer zu den Sieben Weltwundern. 
Philon von Byzanz und andere antike Texte (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1992), p. 26: a[llwn de; por-
furivzei to; crw'ma kai; toi'" dia; kogculivwn qalassobafoumevnai" ejxomoiou'tai. 
51 Methodius, Encomium of Agatha, 3, ed. Mioni, p. 78, ll. 3-4: aJlibafiva/ ... th;n ejsqh`ta ... 
foinivssousa, and p. 78, ll. 9-10: th/` pollh/` ejpicrwvsei th`~ porfurwvsew~. 
52 Indeed the same passage contains an even closer parallel to the excursus in the Life of Eu-
thymius in the characterisation of Agatha’s red dress as ejxomologikh; stolhv, cf. Encomium of 
Agatha, 3, ed. Mioni, p. 78, l. 10. This phrase, which is evidently inspired by Biblical phrases such 
as ejxomolovghsin ... ejneduvsw in Psalm 103:2, is virtually untranslatable: it could refer to Agatha’s 
status as a ‘confessor’ (oJmologhvtria), cf. Encomium of Agatha, 25, ed. Mioni, p. 89, l. 14: ejk qe-
lhvmatov" mou ejxomologhvsomai aujtw'/; but it could also have the meaning ‘promise’, cf. Encomium 
of Agatha, 33, ed. Mioni, p. 92, ll. 36-37: kai; e[cei hJ ejxomolovghsi" - wJ" oJra'te - th;n e[ktisin kai; 
levlutai to; crevo" moi ajpevnqen, and would then refer to God’s promise to the martyrs to give them 
a full reward in Revelation 6:11, which is there accompanied by the gift of a stolhv. Moreover, 
Methodius does not use the regular adjective ejxomologhtikhv but instead employs the otherwise 
unattested form ejxomologikhv, which suggests to the reader that it is derived from logikov~ and 
which thus introduces a third theme, namely that in the case of Agatha the colour of the dress takes 
the place of ‘words’ (rJhvmata) as a means of communciation with the faithful, cf. Encomium of 
Agatha, 3, ed. Mioni, p. 78, ll. 11-12: th'/ tw'n rJhmavtwn ajnelleipei' ojcethgiva/ aujth'". 
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fuvsi~ but also the same duvnami~, while lovgo~ evidently belongs to the hypostatic 
sphere. A claim, however, that the third person of the Trinity is lovgo" in the same 
way as the second person is lovgo~ can only lead to further erosion of the accepted 
Trinitarian framework.53 
In order to substantiate this hypothesis we need to return one more time to the 
terms that Methodius uses in the excursus in order to express consubstantiality: there 
we not only find the term oJmoouvsion but also tautoouvsion and tautoousiovth~,54 
which suggests not only that the two terms are interchangeable but also that the 
two elements oJmo- and tauto- are equivalent. That this is indeed the case can be 
seen from a passage in Methodius’ Life of Theophanes: 
 
tovte dh; prosomologei` aujth`/ eujquvmw~ kai; ajnafqevggetai eijpwvn: ajpo; tou` nu`n 
ajlhqinh; kai; gnhsiva suvmbiov~ mou ei\ su; w\ kuriva kai; ajdelfh; koinwnov~ te tou` 
bivou kai; nu`n kai; eij~ aijw`na to;n mevllonta: hJ de; tautologiva/ tou`ton kai; tw/` 
oJmoivw/ o{rw/ ajmeivbetai eijpou`sa o{ti: taujto; kajmoi; oJ kuvriov~ mou.55 
 
Then he confessed to her fervently and spoke up: ‘From now on you are my true 
and genuine spouse, my lady and sister, and my companion for life both now and 
in the life to come.’ And she responded to him with the same words and with a 
similar definition: ‘The same is true for me as well, my lord.’ 
 
In this passage the young saint outlines his vision for a chaste marriage and his 
bride signals her agreement. The unanimity of the couple is reinforced on the formal 
level in the clauses that introduce the two statements: they both contain twenty-
one syllables. The parallelism is most obvious in the elements ajnafqevggetai 
eijpwvn and ajmeivbetai eijpou`sa, which both consist of seven syllables, but it 
extends also to the first parts of the two clauses: the two correlated expressions 
tautologiva/ and tw`/ oJmoivw/ o{rw/ each take up a part of the preceding verb pros-
omologei`, which signals to the readers that tauto- and oJmo-, as well as lovgo~ 
and o{ro~, are synonymous, and thus suggests an equivalence between oJmologiva 
and tautologiva. This is a clear example of how Methodius provides his readers 
with clues that help them make sense of his writings. I would therefore argue that 
in the Life of Euthymius, too, the readers are meant to consider wJmolovghtai as 
equivalent to tautolovghtai. Late Antique rhetorical treatises define tautologiva 
                                                 
53 I would argue that Methodius has even construed an immediate context that would make his 
readers aware of such a possibility: in the first half of the sentence the uiJov~ was referred to as lovgo~, 
which allows us to rephrase tw'/ uiJw'/ wJmolovghtai as tw/' lovgw/ wJmolovghtai and thus emphasises 
the fact that oJmologei'n is derived from lovgo~. This reading has at least some basis in the convent-
ional use of the verb oJmologei`n, which does not only have the meaning ‘to confess’ but can also 
be used in the sense of ‘correspond’ or ‘conform’, cf. Liddell & Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon 
(Oxford, 1968), s.v. oJmologevw. 
54 Methodius, Life of Euthymius, 33, ed. Gouillard, p. 67, l. 671: th'~ mia'~ fuvsewv~ te kai; taujto-
ousiovthto~, and p. 69, l. 695: to; taujtoouvsion kai; oJmofue;~ kai; ijsobouvlhton. 
55 Life of Theophanes, 13, ed. V. V. Latyšev: Methodii Patriarchae Constantinopolitani Vita S. 
Theophanis Confessoris (Zapiski rossijkoj akademii nauk. viii. ser. po istoriko-filologičeskomu 
otdeleniju, 13.4; Petrograd, 1918), p. 10, ll. 3-7. 
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as ‘a setting side by side of words that mean the same thing, as when we say “they 
are fast and swift”’ (levxewn ... taujto; shmainouswn` paravllhlo~ qevsi~ wJ~ eij 
levgoimen ojxei~` eijsi kai; tacei~`).56 Therefore one can conclude that Methodius 
regards the terms lovgo~ and pneu'ma as synonymous.57 
At this point we can sum up the results of the discussion so far: Methodius has 
eroded all markers of the individuality of the third person of the Trinity and he may 
well have done the same as regards the second person. This means that there are 
still two persons, but they can both be called and characterised in the same way. It 
is evident that this deconstruction of traditional Trinitarian theology also removes 
the basis for the notion of an Imago Trinitatis in the human being, since there are 
no longer functionally distinguishable entities at the level of the divinity for which 
the human mind, speech and breath could serve as an analogy.58 
This raises the question: why would Methodius have embarked on such an extra-
ordinary course? In order to find an answer I will now extend the discussion to the 
context in which he develops his Trinitarian speculation. This context is a defence 
of religious imagery against the Iconoclasts. In his argument Methodius starts with 
a belief that both Iconophiles and Iconoclasts have in common, namely that the 
written and spoken word is an acceptable vehicle for transporting Christian belief, 
and then tries to show that word and image are equivalent so that acceptance of 
one necessarily entails acceptance of the other. This argument is summed up in 
the following statement: 
 
wJ~ ga;r oJ lovgo~ eijkw;n tou' nohvmato~ - ta; ga;r ejnnohqevnta uJpofaivnei kai; dia-
deivknusin - ou{tw~ kai; hJ eijkw;n lovgo~ tou' prwtotuvpou kaqivstatai dia; grafh'~ 
bow'sa tou' ajrcetuvpou ta; ijdiwvmata.59 
 
As the word is the image of the thought – for it reveals and shows what has been 
thought – thus the image is also the word of the prototype, proclaiming the idioms 
of the archetype. 
 
                                                 
56 Cf. Phoebammo, De figuris, 1.3, ed C. Walz, Rhetores Graeci, vol. 8 (Stuttgart, 1835), pp. 
487-519. 
57 In the discussion so far I have considered the meanings of the verb wJmolovghtai and its 
possible variant tautolovghtai in isolation. However, we must also ask whether such an inter-
pretation can make sense in the context of the relative clause o{per ei|" qeo;" su;n tw'/ patri; kai; tw'/ 
uiJw'/ wJmolovghtai of which it is a part. At first sight the syntax seems to be straightforward: the ele-
ment ei|" qeov" is the subject of wJmolovghtai, and the datives tw'/ patriv and tw'/ uiJw'/ are correlated 
through kaiv and therefore both dependent on the preceding preposition suvn. However, this is not 
the only possible reading because one could see two different statements here, namely o{per ei|" 
qeo;" su;n tw'/ patriv (sc. ejsti) and o{per ... tw'/ uiJw'/ wJmolovghtai, because in the sense of ‘correspond’ 
the verb oJmologei`n is construed with the simple dative. Of course, it is impossible to prove beyond 
doubt that this interpretation is correct but given Methodius’ subtle manipulations in the first part of 
the subordinate clause we should be reluctant to stop in this case at the superficial level of meaning. 
58 This may, however, not be as much of a contradiction as it first seems: here we need to re-
member that Methodius had always presented his distinction in terms of operations ad extra. 
59 Methodius, Life of Euthymius, 32, ed. Gouillard, p. 67, ll. 658-660. 
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The exegesis of Genesis 1:26, which we have been discussing so far, is then 
introduced as Biblical corroboration of this claim. As we have seen in our analysis 
of this exegesis, Methodius defines the eijkwvn of God in man not only as lovgo~ 
but as lovgo~ in conjunction with nou`~ and ajeriva oJlkhv. However, he does not 
lose sight of the point that he is trying to prove as can be seen from the following 
statement that he makes in the course of his exegesis: 
 
to; kata; th;n qeivan eijkovna doqe;n hJmi'n kai; dhmiourghqe;n logiko;n tou' oijkeivou 
noo;~ wJ~ gennhvtoro~ uJpofaivnei ta; ejktupwvmata kai; profora'/ th'/ dia; glwvssh~ 
ejpi; to;n ajkouvonta metadivdwsin pneuvmato~ oJlkh'/ kai; plhvxei th'/ ajerivw/ 
tupoumevnou.60 
 
The ‘wordliness’, that has been created and has been given to us according to the 
divine image shows the impressions of the mind as begetter and through utterance 
by tongue passes on to the listener the spirit that is being formed through the drawing 
and beating of air.  
 
Therefore it is not surprising that Methodius concludes his Trinitarian speculations 
with a restatement of the original hypothesis:  
 
eijkw;n ga;r oJ lovgo~ kai; lovgo~ hJ eijkw;n kai; e[stin kai; diadevdeiktai diexodikwtevrai~ 
tai'~ uJfhghvsesin: ejx ou| kai; hJ grafomevnh eijkw;n tw'/ dia; stovmato~ lovgw/ i[sh 
pevfuken.61  
 
The word is image and the image is word and has been shown to be such 
through rather effusive explanations for which reason the painted image, 
too, is equal in nature to the word that comes out of the mouth. 
 
These passages show that Methodius makes his statements about the Trinity in 
order to support an argument in favour of religious imagery. However, the link 
between the two themes is not limited to this level; it also extends to the manner 
in which Methodius presents his argument and therefore can help to elucidate the 
reasons that caused him to ambiguate the inner-Trinitarian relations. 
In order to see how this is possible we need to have a closer look at the intro-
ductory passage to the excursus about the divine image, which I have just quoted. 
There Methodius highlights the functional similarity between word and image – 
both make manifest things that would otherwise remain hidden – but he does not 
make his point by introducing a third more general category such as for example 
‘sign’. Instead he takes the functional similarity as the starting point for attribution 
of the appellation eijkwvn to lovgo~ and of the appellation lovgo~ to eijkwvn. And in very 
much the same way he also does not appeal to the common trait of ‘communication’ 
but instead ascribes to eijkwvn the verb boa'n, which in its strict sense can only refer 
to lovgo~.62 
                                                 
60 Methodius, Life of Euthymius, 33, ed. Gouillard, p. 71, ll. 717-721.  
61 Methodius, Life of Euthymius, 35, ed. Gouillard, p. 73, ll. 741-742. 
62 In a similar way Methodius identifies the dye of Agatha’s dress with her speech, see above 
note 52. 
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It is evident that this approach is very similar to the way in which Methodius 
treats lovgo~ and pneu'ma in his statement about the Trinity. There, too, he starts 
from a functional similarity, the origin in the Father, and then applies to the lovgo~ 
the verb probavllesqai, which in traditional Trinitarian terminology refers to the 
Spirit, and as I have tried to argue he also insinuates that the Spirit can be referred 
to as Son and Word and vice versa. In the case of lovgo~ and eijkwvn the aim of 
Methodius’ manipulations is to show that the two phenomena are equivalent. 
Therefore one can argue that his Trinitarian speculations have a similar purpose, 
namely to safeguard the unity of the Trinity. Here, too, Methodius does not 
establish a link between the divine persons through introduction of the divine 
substance as a more general category, but instead seeks to establish it through 
mutual attribution of ‘hypostatic’ characteristics to the two persons that originate 
in the Father. 
At this point one could object that Methodius repeatedly speaks of the consub-
stantiality of the Trinity. However, this does not permit us to assume that he employs 
the concept in its traditional sense. In the concluding passage of the excursus Me-
thodius uses the phrase i[sh pevfuken to express the relation between lovgo~ and 
eijkwvn. This phrase evidently conjures up the adjective ijsofuhv~,63 which is syn-
onymous with the term oJmofuhv~ that Methodius uses in the Trinitarian excursus 
to denote the consubstantiality of the three divine persons. This means that the two 
phenomena are considered to be ‘consubstantial’ but not by virtue of having a 
common substrate: the consubstantiality is rather sought in analogies at the phe-
nomenological level. There can be no doubt that Methodius wished his readers to 
apply this understanding of consubstantiality to the Trinity as well because the 
statement about the ijsofui?a of eijkwvn and lovgo~ is followed by a statement 
about the Son as eijkwvn, which contains the same verb pevfuken.64 
 
 
 
III. 
 
Methodius’ speculations are so far removed from the Patristic consensus that one 
might consider them to be utterly idiosyncratic. However, it can be shown that they 
are part of a wider debate. In order to make my case I will first look at three texts 
from the eighth and ninth centuries, a Sermon on the icon of Mary ‘the Roman’, 
Epiphanius of Kallistratos’ Life of Mary, and the Letter of the three Patriarchs to 
Emperor Theophilus, which contain descriptions of the appearance of Christ. In 
each case Christ’s features are compared with those of his mother Mary: the an-
onymous author of the Sermon states at the end of a list of common features that 
                                                 
63 Methodius uses the adjective ijsofuhv~ elsewhere in the text, cf. Life of Euthymius, 20, ed. 
Gouillard, p. 49, l. 397: to; ijsofue;" eJautoi'" di’ ajgaqh'" proairevsew" pneu'ma aujtou'. 
64 Methodius, Life of Euthymius, 35, ed. Gouillard, p. 73, ll. 744-45: kai; wJ~ e[fhmen eijkw;n tou` 
qeou` tou` ajoravtou oJ qeo;~ kai; lovgo~ oJ uiJo;~ aujtou` pevfuken. In the remainder of this sentence 
the Father and the Spirit are again added to the Son to take account of the imago Trinitatis. 
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Christ was ‘simply like the appearance of his mother’ (aJplw'" wJ" oJ th'" tekouvsh" 
carakthvr),65 Epiphanius concludes with the statement ‘for in all respects he shared 
with her and was likened to her’ (kata; pavnta ga;r aujth'/ ejkoinwvnei kai; ejxwmoivwto),66 
and in the Letter of the three Patriarchs we find the similar formula ‘showing the 
imprint of the idioms that are similar to those of his mother’ (th'" mhtrwv/a" ejm-
fereiva" ta; ijdiwvmata carakthrivzwn), which is then explained as ‘having the 
colour of wheat in his appearance according to the appearance of the mother’ 
(sitovcroion tw'/ ei[dei kata; th;n mhtrwv/an ejmfavneian).67 In all three texts the 
similarity is thus clearly seen in ‘hypostatic’ terms and Christ is presented as being 
‘in the image’ of Mary. This impression is reinforced by another comparison: 
Christ is described as having ‘cheerful eyes’ (ojfqalmou;~ caropouv~), which is how 
the Bible characterises David, Christ’s human ancestor.68 What is conspicuously 
absent from these statements is the concept of a consubstantiality ‘with us’, that 
is, humankind, of which Mary, David and Christ’s human dimension are individual 
realisations. 
At this point it could be objected that the Letter of the Three Patriarchs at least 
contains a further passage where this shift has not taken place: there we are not 
only told that Christ ‘expressed the idioms of the likeness to Mary’ but also that 
he ‘showed the shape of the race of Adam’ (kai; th;n tou' ajdamiaivou gevnou" 
movrfwsin ejmfaivnwn).69 At first sight this seems to refer to human nature as 
such: John of Damascus, for example, says in his Sermon on Holy Saturday that 
Christ ‘bore in himself the whole nature of the first Adam’ (pa'san ejn eJautw'/ th;n 
tou' prwvtou  jAda;m fevrwn fuvsin) and mentions in the same context that he ‘be-
came consubstantial with us as a human being’ (oJmoouvsio" kai; hJmi'n wJ" a[nqrwpo" 
gegonwv").70 Accordingly, movrfwsi~ could be regarded as a synonym for fuvsi~ 
as was indeed often the case with morfhv.71 Yet when we look more closely at the 
context this interpretation is called into question. As we have seen the parallel 
statement about Christ’s resemblance to his mother is phrased in a very similar 
manner: it contains the noun ejmfavneia, which is derived from the verb ejmfaivnein, 
and with ei\do~ also a synonym of movrfwsi~.72 There, however, the reference is to 
                                                 
65 Sermon on the Image of Maria Rhomaia, ed. E. v. Dobschütz, Christusbilder. Untersuchun-
gen zur christlichen Legende, 3: Beilagen (TU, 18.3, NS, 3; Leipzig, 1899), p. 247**.5. 
66 Epiphanius of Kallistratos, Life of the Godbearer, ed. Dobschütz, Christusbilder, vol. III, p. 
302**, ll. 20-21. 
67 Letter of the Three Patriarchs, ed. Dobschütz, Christusbilder, vol. III, p. 303**, l. 11. 
68 Epiphanius, Life of the Godbearer, ed. Dobschütz, Christusbilder, vol. III, p. 302**, l. 8-10; 
cf. I Kings 17:42. 
69 Letter of the Three Patriarchs, ed. Dobschütz, Christusbilder, III, p. 303**.4-5. 
70 John of Damascus, Sermo in Sabbatum sanctum, 12, ed. B. Kotter, Die Schriften des Johan-
nes von Damaskos, vol. V: Opera homiletica et hagiographica (PTS, 29; Berlin and New York, 
1988), p. 127, ll. 7-8: pa'san ejn eJautw'/ th;n tou' prwvtou  jAda;m fevrwn fuvsin (and before, p. 12, 
ll. 6-7: oJmoouvsio" kai; hJmi'n wJ" a[nqrwpo" gegonw;" sumfuh;" kai; oJmovfulo"). 
71 Cf. G. W. H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon (Oxford, 1961), s.v. morfhv. 
72 Cf. also the whole sentence in the Letter of the Three Patriarchs, ed. Dobschütz, Christusbilder, 
III, p. 303**.3-5: th'" mhtrwv/a" ejmfereiva" ta; ijdiwvmata carakthrivzwn kai; th;n tou'  jAdamaivou 
gevnou" movrfwsin ejmfaivnwn. 
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a specific hair colour and thus to a ‘hypostatic’ characteristic and not to the common 
properties of man as a species. This suggests that in the case of Adam, too, the 
author of the Letter of the Three Patriarchs locates the similarity on the level of 
individual appearance. Indeed, a similar ‘hypostatic’ understanding of Christ’s 
relation to Adam can be found in the Questions and Answers of Anastasius of 
Sinai and of Pseudo-Athanasius, which date to the seventh and eighth centuries. 
When Anastasius responds to the question whether the resurrected will recognise 
each other he says that this is not possible because all men will look like Adam 
before the fall.73 To support this view he adds a reference to the Fathers who de-
fined resurrection as ‘the restitution to the primeval state of the first man’ (th;n 
pro;" to; ajrcai'on tou' prwvtou ajnqrwvpou ajpokatavstasin).74 This is a telling 
misunderstanding, for the Fathers to whom Anastasius refers had, of course, not 
conceived of this restitution in terms of outward appearance.75 The shift is even 
more obvious in the treatment of the same question by Pseudo-Athanasius. This 
author also denies the possibility of mutual recognition after the resurrection and 
explains that we will all look ‘like one man’ (wJ" ei|" a[nqrwpo"), that is, like Adam 
from whom we are all descended: ‘each image of a man is like to the image and 
form and height and shape of Adam’ (pa'sa ajnqrwvpou eijkw;n oJmoiva th'" tou'  jAda;m 
eijkovno" kai; plavsew" kai; megevqou" kai; schvmato").76 Significantly, however, he 
creates a further link between the appearance of the resurrection body and the 
appearance of Christ, which shows that we are in the presence of the same con-
ceptual framework as is set out in the Letter of the Three Patriarchs.77  
We can thus conclude that these texts reflect a coherent framework according 
to which the individual appearances of Christ, of Mary, and of Adam play an im-
portant rôle in defining the relation between Christ’s human part and other human 
beings and  also in conceptualising a common humanity. This raises the question: 
why did Methodius and some of his contemporaries no longer seek unity at the 
level of substance but rather at the level of hypostatic idioms or, in Patristic terms, 
                                                 
73 Anastasius of Sinai, Quaestiones, 19.11, ed. M. Richard and J. Munitiz, Anastasii Sinaitae 
Quaestiones et Responsiones (CC. SG, 59; Turnhout, 2006), p. 34, l. 95 – p. 35, l. 102: oi|o" gev-
gonen oJ  jAda;m toiou'toi pavnte" oiJ ajp’ aijw'no" kekoimhmevnoi ajnistavmeqa. 
74 Anastasius of Sinai, Quaestiones, 19.11, ed. Richard and Munitiz, p. 35, ll. 102-104. 
75 Cf. e.g. Cyril of Alexandria, De recta fide ad Theodosium imperatorem, 36, PG 76, 1188B: 
ajnamorfouvmeqa ga;r wJ" eij" eijkovna th;n qeivan eij" Cristo;n  jIhsou'n ouj swmatiko;n uJpomevnonte" 
to;n ajnaplasmovn: komidh' ga;r eu[hqe" oi[esqai tautiv. 
76 Pseudo-Athanasius, Quaestiones ad Antiochum Ducem, 22, PG 28, 612B: kai; w{sper ajp’ 
ajrch'" oJ qeo;" e{na a[nqrwpon ejpoivhsen ou{tw kai; ejn th'/ paliggenesiva/ pavnte" wJ" ei|" a[nqrwpo" 
ejpanistavmeqa. 
77 Pseudo-Athanasius affirms that all men will be resurrected as ‘a thirty year old perfect man 
... just as Christ was baptized in his thirtieth year, cf. Pseudo-Athanasius, Quaestiones, 22, PG 28, 
612B: triakontaeth' tevleion a[nqrwpon ajnistavmenon kaqw;" kai; oJ Cristo;" triakontaeth;" 
ejbaptivsqh. This statement is obviously based on Ephesians 4:13 and Luke 3:32. Similar passages 
are found in later hagiographical texts such as the tenth-century Life of Nephon of Rhinocorura, 
90, ed. A. V. Rystenko, Materialy z istorii vizantijs’ko-slov’jans’koi literatury ta novy (Odessa, 
1928), p. 98, ll. 23-24. 
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why did they focus on the oJmou>povstaton instead of the oJmoouvsion?78 The study 
of the post-Patristic discourse is still in its infancy and any attempts at explanation 
must therefore be provisional. Nevertheless, I would argue that the development, 
which resulted in Methodius’ position, had already begun in the fourth century 
with the Trinitarian theology of the Cappadocian Fathers. As is well known the 
Cappadocians countered Eunomius’ claim that God’s substance is defined by his 
ajgevnnhton by arguing that ajgevnnhton is merely an attribute and says nothing 
about God’s being. In order to support their position they advocated a total dis-
junction between qualities and substrate. Gregory of Nazianzus, for example, stated 
that for a satisfactory definition of a substance one needs to know not only qualities 
but also the substrate ‘around which’ (peri; o{) these qualities are found, and then 
denied that this was possible.79 According to the philosophical terminology of the 
time this reduces all attributes to the status of accidents whereas the core of being 
becomes completely unknowable.80 Such a conceptual framework leaves no room 
for the traditional Aristotelian view that specific differences are constitutive of 
substance and are therefore not to be equated with mere accidents.81 This disjunction 
had a decisive influence on later discussions, as can be seen in a famous passage 
in Leontius of Byzantium’s Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos where oujsiva is 
juxtaposed with sumbebhkov~ and the latter is defined as ‘all qualitites, both those, 
which are called substantial, and those, which are called para-substantial’ (pas`ai 
aiJ poiovthte~ ai{ te oujsiwvdei~ kai; ejpousiwvdei~ kalouvmenai).82 In the seventh 
and eighth centuries the assimilation of substantial qualities to accidents was taken 
even further. In his Ambigua Maximus restates the Cappadocian position that ‘the 
multitude of that which is seen around them is not sufficient for the complete 
knowledge of things’ (oujk ajrkei' pro;" teleivan gnw'sin tw'n pragmavtwn to; 
plh'qo" tw'n peri; aujta; qewroumevnwn) and then continues with the statement that 
‘as regards being-itself no being is that which is and is referred to as the aggregate of 
the things that we think of or refer to as around it; but that around which those 
things are is something else apart from them’ (oujde;n to; suvnolon tw'n o[ntwn ejsti; 
kat’ aujto; to; ei\nai o{per ejsti; kai; levgetai to; a[qroisma tw'n hJmi'n peri; aujto; 
nooumevnwn te kai; legomevnwn ajll’ e{terovn ti para; tau'ta to; peri; o} tau'tav 
ejsti).83 
The term a[qroisma, which is used here, denotes an unstructured ‘heap’ and had 
traditionally been reserved for hypostatic idioms. Porphyry, for example, states in 
                                                 
78 For a juxtaposition of the two terms in a statement about Christ’s relation to the Father and to 
David, cf. Leontius of Jerusalem, Contra Nestorianos, II.1, PG 86, 1533B. 
79 Gregory of Nazianzus, Orationes, XXVIII.9, ed. Gallay, p. 118, l. 15. 
80 Cf. e. g. Aristotle, De anima, 402a7-8, ed. D. Ross (Oxford, 1961): ejpizhtou'men de; qewrh'sai 
kai; gnw'nai thvn te fuvsin aujth'" (sc. th'" yuch'") kai; th;n oujsivan ei\q’ o{sa sumbevbhke peri; 
aujthvn. 
81 Cf. e.g. M. V. Wedin, Aristotle’s theory of substance: the Categories and Metaphysics Zeta 
(Oxford and New York, 2002). 
82 Leontius of Byzantium, Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos, PG 86, 1277D. 
83 Maximus, Ambigua, PG 91, 1225CD. 
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his Isagoge that ‘such things are called individuals because each of them is made up 
of idioms whose aggregate could not ever come into being in another one identically’ 
(a[toma ou\n levgetai ta; toiau'ta o{ti ejx ijdiothvtwn sunevsthken e{kaston w|n to; 
a[qroisma oujk a]n ejp’ a[llou pote; to; aujto; gevnoito),84 and this definition is then 
reproduced in Patristic texts where hypostasis is characterised as an ‘aggregate of 
accidents’ (a[qroisma sumbebhkovtwn).85 By contrast, Maximus now applies this 
term to the properties of species. This shift is even more obvious in the writings of 
John of Damascus. In his treatise De duabus in Christo voluntatibus John states 
that it is impossible for a nature to exist without its natural idioms, which constitute 
it and which distinguish it from the other natures, and then adds the comment ‘the 
aggregate of which will not be seen in another species’ (w|n to; a[qroisma ejn eJtevrw/ 
ouj qewrhqhvsetai ei[dei).86 Here this definition of nature is immediately followed 
by the traditional definition of hypostasis as being constituted and distinguished 
from other hypostases through hypostatic idioms ‘the aggregate of which cannot 
be seen in another hypostasis’ (w|n to; a[qroisma ejf’ eJtevra" uJpostavsew" qew-
rhqh'nai ajmhvcnanon).87 This sequence shows clearly that John of Damascus saw 
no categorical difference whatsoever between substantial and hypostatic qualities: 
both are unstructured assemblages. Under these circumstances it comes as no surprise 
that some late Patristic authors no longer define oujsiva in Aristotelian fashion as a 
combination of genus and specific differences but rather give long descriptive lists. 
For example, in a Pseudo-Athanasian Sermon on the Annunciation, which can be 
dated to the eighth or to the early ninth century, the human oujsiva is defined as the 
a[qroisma of the following idioms: ‘created, … intelligent, rational, animate, cor-
poreal, passible, soluble, subject to time, mortal, capable of being born, corruptible, 
capable of growth, changeable, alterable, capable of feeling sorrow, and whatever 
else can be said equally about a human being by way of selection and analogy’ (to; 
ktistovn ... to; noero;n to; logiko;n to; e[myucon to; swmatiko;n to; paqhtiko;n 
to; rJeusto;n to; croniko;n to; qnhto;n to; gennhto;n to; fqarto;n to; aujxhtiko;n 
to; trepto;n to; ajlloiwto;n to; luphro;n kai; o{sa a[lla toiau`ta kata; ajnalogivan 
kai; ejklogismo;n ejpivsh~ ejpi; to;n a[nqrwpon lambanovmena).88 
Unlike the Cappadocians, the author of the Sermon on the Annunciation use the 
term oujsiva for the oujsiwvdei~ poiovthte~ and not for the substrate, which is now 
identified with hypostasis.89 However, this shift in the meaning of nature and hy-
                                                 
84 Porphyry, Isagoge, ed. A. Busse, Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium 
(CAG, IV.1; Berlin, 1887), p. 7, ll. 21-23: a[toma ou\n levgetai ta; toiau'ta o{ti ejx ijdiothvtwn 
sunevsthken e{kaston w|n to; a[qroisma oujk a]n ejp’ a[llou pote; to; aujto; gevnoito. 
85 Cf. Anastasius of Antioch, Dialogue with a Tritheite, ed. Sakkos, p. 99, ll. 651-652: uJpovstasiv" 
ejstin ajforistikoi; carakth're" tw'/dev tini kai; movnw/ prosovnte" h[goun a[qroisma sumbebhkovtwn; 
and Maximus, Opuscula, PG 91, 276AB: a[tomovn ejstin kata; me;n tou;" filosovfou" ijdiwmavtwn 
sunagwgh; w|n to; a[qroisma ejp’ a[llou qewrei'sqai ouj duvnatai. 
86 John of Damascus, De duabus in Christo voluntatibus, 1, ed. Kotter, p. 173, ll. 1-4. 
87 John of Damascus, De duabus in Christo voluntatibus, 1, ed. Kotter, pp. 173-174, ll. 6-10. 
88 Pseudo-Athanasius, Sermon on the Annunciation, 3, PG 28, 921A9-14. For the date, cf. M. 
Jugie, ‘Deux homélies patristiques pseudépigraphes’, EO 39 (1940), pp. 283-289. 
89 This conceptual framework can be traced back to the sixth century. Leontius of Byzantium, for 
example, states in his Epilyseis that ‘the appellation ‘Christ’ does not signify nature but hypostasis 
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postasis was primarily due to the constraints of the Christological model developed 
by the defenders of Chalcedon and did not affect the underlying framework, which 
is remarkably consistent: a core of being that is beyond human understanding is 
juxtaposed with accidents. In this framework one can still say that some accidents 
can be found in all members of a species but this fact does not give these accidents 
a special status nor permit the conclusion that their totality forms a distinct entity: 
as we have seen they are nothing more than an ‘aggregate’ of essentially unconnected 
features. As a consequence, any likeness short of identity must be considered in-
complete and unity can only be achieved if it includes the hypostatic dimension as 
well. I would argue that this is the context for Methodius’ Trinitarian speculations 
and that his strategy of mutually attributing names and definitions to the Son and 
the Spirit (as well as to image and word) was a well-considered response to the 
erosion of the concept of substance. Although he makes his case by exploiting 
existing terminological ambiguities and would therefore undoubtedly have claimed 
that he was merely explicating what had already been implicit in traditional Trini-
tarian theology the solution he arrived at was clearly highly original. And yet it 
would have been very easy to miss this originality: indeed, Jean Gouillard, the 
editor of the Life of Euthymius, considered the whole passage to be derivative.90 
With this article I hope to have shown that far from being fossilised the theological 
discourse of the late and post-Patristic period produced new and exciting ideas. 
These ideas are developed within a conceptual framework whose roots can be 
traced back to the fourth and fifth centuries but which would itself have been 
completely alien to earlier theologians. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
around which (sc. the hypostasis) the natures are seen <and> in which (sc. the natures) the person 
is separated out’ (th'" Cristou' proshgoriva" ouj fuvsin ajll’ uJpovstasin shmainouvsh" peri; h}n 
aiJ fuvsei" oJrw'ntai kai; ejn ai|" to; provswpon ajforivzetai), cf. Leontius of Byzantium, Epilyseis, 
PG 86, 1928A. 
90 Cf. Gouillard, ‘Vie d’Euthyme’, p. 16. 
